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Many of today's most  significant socioeconomic problems, such as slower 
economic growth, t he  decline of some established industries, and  shifts in  pat- 
t e rns  of foreign trade, a r e  inter- o r  transnational in  nature.  But these prob- 
lems manifest themselves in  a variety of ways; both the  intensities and  the  per- 
ceptions of the  problems differ from one country to another,  so tha t  intercoun- 
t ry  comparative analyses of recent  historical developments a r e  necessary. 
Through these analyses we a t tempt  to identify t he  underlying processes of 
economic s t ruc tura l  change and formulate useful hypotheses concerning 
future developments. The understanding of these processes and  future pros- 
pects provides t h e  focus for IIASA's project on Comparative Analysis of 
Economic Structure and Growth. 
Our research concentrates  primarily on the empirical analysis of interre-  
gional and intertemporal economic s t ructural  change, on the  sources of and 
constraints on economic growth, on problems of adaptation t o  sudden changes, 
and  especially on problems arising from changing patterns of international 
trade, resource availability, a n d  technology. The project relies on IIASA's accu- 
mulated expertise in  related flelds and, in particular,  on the da ta  bases and  sys- 
tems of models t ha t  have been developed in the recent  past. 
In this paper, Cesare Marchetti presents a review of t h e  development of 
world energy markets  over the  last  two centuries.  This is then used a s  a spring- 
board for projections of the  likely future penetration of natural  gas. 
Marchetti's hypothesis is t ha t  society can be viewed as  an ensemble of com- 
ponent s t ructures  engaged in Darwinian competition; his analysis leads to  
interesting and  perhaps surprising conclusions on long-term energy price s ta-  
bility, the  future role of na tura l  gas, and the  vexed question of whether or  no t  
there  really is a global energy shortfall. 
Anatoli Smyshlyaev 
Project Leader 
Comparative Analysis of 
Economic Structure and Growth 
ON THE LONGTEXM HISTORY OF ENERGY MARKEX3 AND THE CHANCES FOR 
NATURAL GAS 
INTRODUCTION 
Tradition gives a sense of security, and a sense of security is badly needed 
in the battered area of energy. So I will delve into tradition, i.e. the last couple 
of centuries, to  detect the constant factors and t ry  to answer these prickly 
questions from a solid, long-term perspective. 
I must say the image I will draw is basically reassuring. Energy will not be 
short during our lifetime and, quite possibly, it never will be. Politics apart. 
Prices have remained curiously constant, in constant money, over the centu- 
ries, with relatively short spikes. The OPEC spike will be reabsorbed in the next 
few years. The market penetration of new primary sources proceeds with the 
stately speed of glaciers and never runs uphill. So we are safe from the devilish 
return of coal, and also from "green" concoctions. Natural gas will be the fuel 
of our lifetime, with nuclear slowly increasing its share and the rest slowly fad- 
ing int,o oblivion. All that will emerge from the maze of cycles and epicycles 
that make Western society such an admirable and predictable clockwork sys- 
tem. 
These results have been obtained using a single heuristic hypothesis: 
S oc i e t y  c a n  be decomposed  i n t o  f o r m &  s t r u c t u r e s  that c o m p e t e  in a hrwiniun 
w a y .  
THE ENERGY MARKETS 
Let us begin to analyze the energy market a t  the world level. After all, the 
supertanker has made energy a world commodity. Following our hypothesis, 
the primary energy sources, such as wood, coal, oil, gas, and nuclear, can be 
seen as "structures", i.e. socio-techno-economic networks, competing to con- 
quer the energy market. The struggle can be displayed if we measure the 
market and the sources in homogeneous terms, like tons of coal equivalent, 
and if we plot the various market shares versus time. Energy consumption by 
source is given in Figure 1, and shares are reported in Figure 2, where the  basic 
equation of competition, logF/ 1-F = at + b ,  is used to fit the data. F is here 
the share of one of the competitors (usually the winner), and 1-F is that of the 
other. The parameter a expresses the rate of the penetration, and b locates 
the process in time (Marchetti and Nakicenovic 1979). 
In the case of Figure 2, where various competitors are present a t  the same 
time, the arithmetic is slightly more complicated formally, but the substance 
is the same (Nakicenovic 1979). We are now dealing with simple solutions of the 
Volterra-Lotka differential equations for ecological competition (Montroll et al. 
1971). 
FIGURE 1 World primary energy consumption (10 tce ) .  
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FlGURE 2 World primary energy substitution. 
Some of the reassuring features announced in the Introduction can be 
already seen by inspecting Figure 2. Straight lines that span a century mean' 
that  the rate constants a have stayed constant, i.e. that the  behavior of society 
toward acceptance or rejection of a certain type of primary energy did not 
change for a century. Which is remarkable, to say the least. 
These equations involve two parameters, as  we have seen, and conse- 
quently only two points, e.g. the data for two years, are in principle necessary 
to fit them. Because the data are noisy, as can be seen from the wriggling lines 
in:Figure 2, longer swaths are needed to smooth out the noise. Figure 3 shows 
ari experiment in forecasting and "backcasting" using a swath of twenty years, 
between 1900 and 1920, as  a data base. The inputs are the  wriggling lines in the  
grey area. The equations, represented by the smooth lines, are fitted using 
them. The data outside the  grey area have been superposed afterwards. This 
particular example shows the remarkable capacity of this competition model to 
forecast and backcas t primary energy market s tructures even Afty years for- 
ward and backward. There is nothing magic in it, except for the fact that  aggre- 
gate social behavior is incredibly stable. Just like in physics, where the indivi- 
dual drives and actions of single molecules, are balanced and compensated, 
resulting in the smoothness and stability of thermodynamic laws. 
I keep stressing the  question of stability because it is a necessary concept 
for supporting the bright future of natural gas expressed in the  right side of 
Figure 2. And I would like to strike the nail once more. 
People living in a given era tend to think it represents the  high point of 
human history, and is quintessentially different from anything that  went 
before. In our own era, World War I1 is seen as marking a fundamental break for 
Western societies. 
To dispel this excessively proud and widespread sentiment, I present Figure 
4, where the hundred years before World War I1 are backcast, using only data 
from the period after 1945 to fit the equations. If our world were really 
different, we could not extract from i t  such vital and precise information about 
the past. 
My arguments are not confined to what is shown in world processes. The 
same type of analysis can be done for substructures, such as nations or indus- 
tries, and for technologies competing inside industries, or  even in the Aeld of 
science. After a lecture I gave a t  CERN in Geneva, the  capacity of various 
machines to seduce customers was analyzed in the  same way with excellent 
results. At present, I have a portfolio of about four hundred cases, mostly stu- 
died a t  IIASA, showing the breadth and precision of this exceedingly simple and 
powerful tool of analysis. Surely, Darwin did not expect to  have gone so deep. 
Some of these result a re  reported in Marchetti (1980a, 1983a) and Sanford 
(1983). 
THE EXPANDING HESOURCES 
The previous considerations refer to  the structure of the market but say 
really nothing about quantities and their relation to  physical resources. Cer- 
tainly, multiplying market fractions by market size, we get  absolute quantities, 
but for market size prediction I could not find an equally stringent logic. 
For the world market, totals including noncommercial energy are reported 
in Figure 5. The only clear pattern here is that  in the  last century or so, energy 
consumption grew quite steadily by 2.3% per year. The simplest decision is to 
assume "business as usual" for the future. To e r r  on the pessimistic side, I 
assumed 3% annual growth for the  future considered. I feel that  these flgures 
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FIGURE 3 World primary energy substitution (short data). 
FIGURE 4 World primary energy "backcasting" from postwar data (after 
Peterka). 
are fairly safe, since through analyzing in detail the development of energy use 
I found that much of the virtual expansion came via increasing efficiency in 
use. And mean (second-law) efficiency of energy use for society as a whole is 
still low - less than 5%. Consequently, a lot of expansion is still possible there. 
Taking the assumption at face value, and multiplying the fractions of Fig- 
ure 2 by the totals of Figure 5, we obtain the physical quantities shown in Fig- 
ure 6 for each of the primary energies, homogeneously expressed in tons of 
coal equivalent. The smooth lines are the products of the equations and the  
wriggling lines as usual represent the statistical data. 
TABLE 1. Cumulative world energy consumption (lo9 tons of coal equivalent). 
- - - - - - - - - - 
Natural Rejected 
Wood Coal Oil Gas Nuclear Solfusa Atmos. C02 
1860-1974 
2.3% growth 
rate 25 125 55 2 5 0.4 6 5 
1975-2050 
3% growth 
rate 2.5 80 210 550 750 250 190 
Reserves 1000 100 100 
Resources 3ob 10000 400 300 
Solar, fusion, etc. 
Renewable annual output. 
Assumptions on market shares: Nuclear 1% in 1970 and 10% in 2000; 
Solfus 1% in 2000 and 10% in 2030. 
In this exercise I make integrals over periods of time and compare this 
demand with resources and reserves, as reported in Table 1. This comparison is 
interesting because, for example, it  explodes the myth that  the driving force 
for exploiting new primary energy sources is the exhaustion of the previous 
ones. This is certainly not t rue  for wood and coal, where resources are such, a t  
the world level, that  we could happily run our system on either of them for a 
considerable number of years ahead. And also for oil, there is no physical rea- 
son for a downturn. Incidentally, as shown in Table 2, estimates for final 
reserves have kept increasing since 1940, which is just a manifestation of our 
slowly growing knowledge about the location of oil deposits. As shown 'by 
Menard and Sharman (1975), this knowledge is really acquired mostly through 
drilling and, from this angle, the Earth's crust is mostly unexplored. A palpable 
hint of the truth of such statements is Table 2, which reports oil findings per 
meter  of exploratory wells drilled in various parts of the world Not only virgin 
Africa, but also worn-out Europe fare outstandingly well. 
Before leaving these global considerations, I would like to  present a piece 
of evidence, which points to the dominance of subjacent physical rather  than 
monetary indicators. The sinusoid in Figure 7 is the fit to deviations in electri- 
city and total energy consumption with respect to the secular trend in the 
United States. The line with peaks over it  is the  indexed (up to 1880) arid 
constant-money price for energy in the United States or on the international 
FIGURE 5 World primary energy consumption (10 tce). 
10' TCE 
FIGURE 6 World primary energy inputs (10 tce). 
TABLE 2. Drilling finding rates  (barrels per foot drilled). 
United Western Latin 
Period States Europe America Africa 
1970-1974 7 520 200 520 
1960-1964 6 17 5 7 380 
1950-1954 7 40 8 0 37 
6ource: B.F. Grossling. 
market  after oil s tar ted to be internationally traded. The flares in prices neatly 
coincide with t h e  first parts of the downswings in consumption shown by the  
sinusoid. which by the  way has a strong connection with economic activity, 
invention and innovation waves plus Kondratiev cycles, as  discussed in detail in 
Marchetti (1980b). Because the flares in price have a width of about t en  years, 
a substantial fall in oil prices is due shortly. 
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F'IGURE 7 Invention and innovation waves - the  secular set.  
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Much has been said about the future mix of primary energies tha t  will keep 
us warm and moving for the  next fifty years with the  revival of this and tha t  and 
with ingenious new ways to utilize old energies. My s ta tements  a re  condensed 
in the  aseptic curves of Figure 2. The t ime constants of societal behavior will 
keep t h e  contribution of new technologies on the  negligible side, whatever t h e  
degree of s ta te  support, as recent  American experience clearly demonstrates. 
On the  other hand, no case of technological substitution I have ever analyzed 
has shown a revival. This argues directly against a newly increasing share of 
coal in the global energy budget. So, as the figure shows, we are  left with gas, 
becoming progressively dominant during the next fifty years, and nuclear claw- 
ing its way up, albeit with a fifty-year handicap. This is certainly not a condem- 
nation of nuclear, which incidentally was born a t  the right time in the cycle as  
detailed in  Marchetti (1980b), but only a refocusing of interest and potential 
into the natural gas area. 
Natural gas has a long history of managed use, and already by the  year 
1000 methane wells and a ne t  of bamboo pipelines served the capital city of 
Peking. The same fields are  active today and there is a suspicion tha t  this 
methaXe is of nonorganic origin, i.e. linked to volcanic seeps, which could 
explain the longevity of the fields. 
The success of methane really began in the last century, with the advent of 
the  steel pipeline. So something that  was originally considered a nuisance, 
making crude oil fizz, could be burned somewhere for some useful purpose. 
This "by-product" tag has always accompanied natural gas, and showed up in 
consistently low prices with respect to  oil, calorie for calorie, and in  monumen- 
tal blasphemies ut tered when oil men, after long and expensive toil, discovered 
"dry" gas. 
The situation changed drastically, if gradually, after World War 11, and for 
different reasons in different places. In America a well-established market  and 
ramified transportation system made i t  easier to tie up the unlucky, but finally 
profitable, dry gas fields. In Holland and Italy the discovery of a consistent gas 
deposit was considered a blessing, if a somewhat second-rate one, as these 
countries had no oil. My interpretation, if not contradictory, points in another 
direction. Things tend to happen when they "fit" (Marchetti 1980b). Methane is 
distributed by a network of pipelines, which becomes competitive when a cer- 
tain minimum spatial density of energy consumption is reached. 
Spatial density increases with the population density in a certain area  and 
the  level of individual consumption. All over the world, the  population implodes 
into the  cities, and, becoming richer,  consumes more. So the critical level is 
surpassed a t  an increasing rate. After that,  the distribution net  being usually 
oversized in te rms of capacity, every increase in consumption can be accom- 
modated a t  basically zero marginal cost, making the implant irreversible. 
On the other hand, i ts secondary features make methane ideal for urban 
areas: it does not interfere with transportation, i t  does not pollute, i t  is 
friendly to the equipment used to burn it ,  and, finally, i t  makes life automatic. 
I a m  drawing a rosy picture here, which is an at tempt t.o interpret the  
stately market  penetration of Figure 2. The black side is still t he  fact t ha t  gas 
is costly and complicated to transport. over long distances, which is a clear 
cause of immense waste, e.g. in t.he Middle East. The curves are  a challenge to 
the ingenuity of scientists and engineers. 
One solution could be to transform methane into methanol a t  source. 
Present processes have about as much elegance as killing mosquitos with 
dynamite, but soil bacteria make the transformation in one go a t  room tem- 
perature. Chemists a re  trying to  steal their subtle "tour de main" so  far 
without success, but there is always hope for the future. Methanol can be tran- 
sported by supertanker or cheap pipeline, and mixed with the gasoline pool as  a 
nonlead anti-knock component a t  first, and finally as a straight fuel. Much work 
is going on to check this business end of the line. 
The second line of attack is to  install pipelines larger than the present 
maximum of about 1.5-meter diameter. The Russians s tar ted with a 2.5-meter 
project, but I do not know of other attempts. The rationale lies in the fact tha t  
transportation costs are roughly inversely proportional to pipe diameter, so the  
3000 km accessible to a 1.5-meter pipe could, without excessive economic 
strain, become 6000 km with a 3-meter pipe. Throughput would be about seven 
times larger, but sources and markets of sufficient size already exist, such as 
e.g. Europe and Siberia, the Middle East and Western Africa, or Japan and 
Siberia. 
All that is speculation, but let us look at what is happening in the real 
world, and haruspicate from that.  
1 am currently making a study of the  deployment of large infrastructures, 
like canals, railways, roads, telegraphs, and telephones, over the  last three cen- 
turies, to see what might be more appropriate in terms of anticonjunctural 
public works, i.e. devices that could counteract the adverse impacts of secular 
trends and cycles. After all, the recession is going to stay with us for another 
ten years. as analyzed in Marchetti (1980b, 1983b). 
One of the  important infrastructures for the  next fifty years will obviously 
be the  gas network, and I will describe here some of the results of the  analysis, 
if still in a preliminary state. 
The simplest way to describe the evolution of a spatial network is to meas- 
ure its length vs. time. The final length can be calculated approximately 
depending on the actual stage of deployment and noise in the  data. For the  
three-parameter logistics presented here, m y  guess is a 10% error,  regardless 
of the  qualitative considerations I will draw from the cases. The fitting is done 
by visual interpolation of the data on the linear transform, for different satura- 
tion values, till a straight line is obtained. 
The case of trunklines (major gas pipelines) is reported in Figure 8 for the  
European Community, in Figure 9 for Italy, and in Figure 10 for the  l X G .  In all 
three cases we are not far from a 50% stage, where the  final objective is 
reported as the number in parentheses. For Italy it is around 30,000 km and for 
the FRG 60,000. The time constants are  of about 40 years, and the present 
stage of realization about 50%, meaning that this spurt should thin out in 
twenty years. My proposal, in passing, would be to condense this activity into 
ten years as an  anticonjunctural device for suffering industxies, like steel and 
civil construction. F'igure 11 illustrates the situation for the entire gas pipeline 
system in the EEC. 
At this point, a natural question arises: if it has to be gas, where will all of 
this stuff come from? The answer may appear naive: from the  bowels of the  
earth. 
Gas is a simpler and more abundant substance than oil. Beyond a certain 
depth, only gas can be found. I t  is also more mobile, facilitating displacement 
into traps. The maturing of coal releases large amounts of gas, but no oil. And, 
last but not least, there is increasing evidence that methane is par t  of Mother 
Earth's exhalations, together with the more classical ones HZO, SO2 and H,S. 
This may give rise to large pools of abiogenic gas, unexpected on the basis of 
normal geological thinking, and consequently not looked for. A workshop on the  
subject was held in May 1983 a t  Oak Ridge to review the evidence on such a 
hypothesis, originally presented by the astrophysicist Tommy Gold. 
Another area so far overlooked is that  of unsealed layers where methane is 
kept in place by capillary forces. Large deposits have been found in Canada, fol- 
lowing that  lead, and now one is being explored in Germany tha t  reaches all the  
way to  Britain. 
FIGURE 8 Major gas pipelines in the European Community (final "objective" 
160,000 km). 
FIGURE 9 G a s  t runk  lines - t h e  FRG (final "objective" 60,000 km). 
FIGURE 10 Gas trunk lines - Italy (final "objective" 30,000 km). 
FIGURE 11 Gas transportation and distribution pipeline length (source: 
Inf.. 1976). 
Without attaching any figures to  these new exploration areas,  i t  is evident 
to m e  - being in touch with those closely involved - t ha t  they will add a lot t o  
the figure for reserves reported in Table 1. After all, we need only a doubling of 
this figure which, according to t h e  trends of Figure 12, may only need 20 years 
of searching. 
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FIGURE 12 Estimates of world ultimate reserves of crude oil. 
CONCLUSIONS 
I would like to close and draw some conclusions a t  this point. Although my 
analysis of t he  behavior of t he  energy (and social) system, using Darwinian 
principles and systems-analysis practice, is still in a fluid stage, the  conclu- 
sions are clearly optimistic, in  a broad sense. In a nutshell, society operates 
through stable mechanisms that  make its long-term aggregate behavior 
predictable; energy is abundant by all measures; the next form of primary 
energy has all the  prerequisites to satisfy consumers, producers, environmen- 
talists, and perhaps even steelmakers; "soft" energies have essentially no  
chance for the  next fifty years, which saves us from pangs of conscience; and 
last but not least, prices will fall shortly. 
In the short  run,  however, both temporally and spatially, there is no doubt 
tha t  problems still lurk. Energy is too important not to  be coveted by politi- 
cians as a tool for their  designs. I hope tha t  throwing l.ight into the mechan- 
isms involved will reduce the  amount of tampering. 
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